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UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial and least understood sections of the
Uniform Commercial Code is section 2-302, dealing with unconscionable
contracts or clauses. The section provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.'
This section has been characterized as embodying a new social concept
which will enable the courts to invalidate or remake many contracts on
the basis of a vague discretionary standard. Such criticism betrays fears of
"wildcat law-suits by over-optimistic counsel," of strike suits that will be
settled for nuisance value, of holdup defenses that will force settlement, and,
most significantly, of a disruptive effect on business affairs, which rely
heavily upon the stability of contractual arrangements.
2
The anxiety concerning this admittedly novel 3 development in our
sales law demands a determination of the reach of the section as applied to
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. Six states have enacted the Code. Conn.
Acts 1959, Pub. Act No. 133 (effective Oct. 1, 1961) ; Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77; MASS.
ANN. LAWs ch. 106 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954), as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A (Supp. 1959); R.I. Laws 1960, fit. 6A (effective Jan. 2, 1962); see
N.H. Laws 1959, ch. 247, § 1 (effective July 1, 1961). Preparation is being made
for the presentation of the Code to the 1961 legislatures of thirteen states: Arkansas,
California, Illinois, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 28 U.S.L. WEK 2584 (May 24,
1960).
21 N.Y. LAW REviSION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COmmRCIAL CODE
63-64 (1955); N.Y. LAW REVIsION COMMISSION, REPORT RELATING TO THE UNIFORM
COmERCIAL CODE 37 (1956) ; Note, Definition and Interpretation of Unconscionable
Contracts, 58 DICK. L. REv. 161 (1954) ; Note, Policing Contracts Under the Proposed
Commercial Code, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 146 (1950). But see Latty, Sales and Title
and the Proposed Code, 16 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 3, 19 & n.78 (1951); Note, 45
VA. L. REv. 583, 591 (1959) ; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954).
3 The comment to § 2-302 states that there is no prior uniform statutory pro-
vision on which the section is based. See PENNSYLvANIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE
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current sales practice. Although the term "unconscionability" 4 has seldom
been explicitly judicially construed,5 the courts by various semicovert
devices 6 have provided a body of law from which a doctrine of unconscion-
ability can be drawn. From the underlying rationale of these cases certain
common factors can be isolated which will serve as guidelines for predict-
ing the future application of section 2-302. These factors indicate that the
provision empowers the courts to do directly what they have long been
doing indirectly.7 To supplement this investigation, a comparative analysis
of the similarly oriented civil-law doctrines of gute Sitten in Germany 
8 and
ordre public in France 9 offers an opportunity to evaluate the concept of
unconscionability in a setting where it is explicitly invoked. This Note will
seek to demonstrate that the Uniform Commercial Code provision intro-
duces into the law of sales a much needed principle that will lend order
to existing inconsistency without impinging upon the doctrine of "freedom
of contract."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A study of the history of section 2-302 gives only a general indication
of its intended operation. Perhaps the most revealing feature of this de-
velopment is the tendency of the draftsmen to broaden the section's ap-
plicability. When first proposed in 1944 as section 23 of the Uniform
Revised Sales Act, the operation of the unconscionability principle was
PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8, 18 (1952); Cosway, Sales-A Comparison
of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WASH. L. Ray.
412, 426 (1960); A Symposium of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code-Sales,
17 ALBANY L. REv. 11, 22-23 (1953).
4 Although no cases can be found which have stricken a contract or clause under
§2-302, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
which arose in a state which has not yet adopted the Code, cited it by way of analogy.
Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95. (Although the report reads § 202, the context makes it
obvious that §2-302 was intended.) The approach of the court in Henningsen would
seem apposite for a court applying § 2-302 in light of the factors considered by the
court in voiding the disclaimer.
5 One of the few cases where it was expressly considered is Hume v. United
States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889), which adopted the definition found in Earl of Chesterfield
v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750): an unconscionable
bargain is one "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other . .. ."
Other attempts by the courts to state a definition are similarly vague. See Franklin
Fire Ins. Co. v. Noll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 294, 58 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1945) ; Stiefler v.
McCullough, 97 Ind. App. 123, 130, 174 N.E. 823, 826 (1931) (alternative holding).
6 See Llewellyn, What Price Contractf-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 733-36 (1931); Note, Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HA~v. L. Rov. 494
(1950); Note, Grower-Canner Agreements: An Abuse of Mass Standardized Con-tracts, 58 YALE L.J. 1161 (1949); Note, Warranties of Kin d Quality Under the
Uniform Revised Sales Act, 57 YALE LJ. 1389, 1401-04 (1948); Llewellyn, BookReview, 52 -ALv. L. REv. 700 (1939).
T HAwKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES UNDER THE .UNIFORM COMM%%ERCIAL CODE22-24 (1958); PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE P 4OrD UNIFORM Coe ERcIa
CODE 18 (1952).
s See notes 86-89, 95-102 infra and accompanying text.
9 See notes 90-94 infra and accompanying text.
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limited to form contract clauses ;10 their widespread use by industry under-
lay the decision that reform of the law dealing with such contracts was
most urgent. This purpose was still foremost in the proponents' minds
when the first tentative draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was issued
in 1949.11 At this time another equally common situation was also noted:
that in which a party has knowingly acquiesced in a one-sided and oppres-
sive bargain.12  To both circumstances-the unbargained agreement to a
form contract and the assent to an oppressive bargain-the section was
"intended to apply . . . the equity courts' ancient policy of policing
contracts for unconscionability or unreasonableness." 13
When the time came to submit a final draft for state legislative ap-
proval, however, reference to the equity doctrine was deleted in favor of the
more general "basic test" found in the current comment to the section. 14
The comment invited the courts to "police explicitly" harsh contracts rather
than having resort to adverse construction of language or twisted applica-
tion of contract law as was the prior practice. Nevertheless, the avowed
intent of the proponents of the Code in giving the courts this power was not
to disturb the allocation of risk flowing from the bargaining power of the
parties, but rather to prevent oppression and unfair surprise.15
The present version of section 2-302 amends the 1952 final draft so as
to give the courts the alternative of modification in addition to the power
10 Uniform Revised Sales Act § 23 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
11 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, comment (Tent. Draft 1949). Subsection
(2) also made reference to form clauses. Section 1-102(3) (f) of the 1952 official
draft stated as one of the "rules of construction!' that the comments could be consulted
in the construction and application of the Code. In the present draft, this rule was
deleted from § 1-102 and is found in substantially the same form in the comment to
the title. The function of the comments is "to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing
the Act as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction."
1 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, comment (Tent. Draft 1949) provided:
"Another common type of situation arising in connection with unconscionable con-
tracts or clauses consists of cases where one party has deliberately entered into a
lopsided bargain with full knowledge and awareness and has actually assented to
clauses which are unconscionable in effect against him."
13 UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, comment (Tent. Draft 1949).
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §-2-302, comment (Proposed Final Draft, Spring
1950), sets forth the same basic test as is found in the current version. The current
comment reads: "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing
at the time of the making of the contract." For the same reason, it was suggested
that the words "refuse to enforce" be rephrased "to avoid the inference that it deals
only with the question of specific performance." ALI, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
MAY MEETING REvISIONS TO PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 2 (1951).
15UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, comment. This goal of protecting the
ordinary consumer from harsh contracts was recognized by commissions appointed
by state legislatures to study the Code. See 1 N.Y. LAw REvIsION COMMISSION,
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 655-61 (1955). This theme is also noted
by the Pennsylvania Joint State Government Commission Report. In this report, it
is stated that the section's approach may be novel to sales law but nonetheless is
consistent with the results of decisions which have avoided harsh provisions in sales
contracts by narrow construction. PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 18 (1952).
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of complete voidance of an unconscionable contract or clause.16 The deter-
mination of unconscionability remains with the court rather than the jury,
1 7
and the time of the creation of the contract is still the crucial point at which
the section's test is to be applied.' 8  But unfortunately, the comment to the
present draft continues the so-called "basic test" which, in view of its
definition of unconscionability in terms of itself,19 is an unhelpful tautology.
It is significant that there was again no explicit reference to form contracts.
The comment retains, in an attempt to indicate a definitional standard, illus-
trative cases in which courts have voided unfair bargains.20  On their
face these decisions are inconclusive; with the exception of the leading
equity case on unconscionable sales contracts,21 they involve disclaimers of
warranty or limitations of remedy-both of which are expressly treated by
other specific provisions of the Code.22  Despite the apparent overlap of
16The 1952 draft was criticized for limiting the judicial remedy to the complete
invalidation of the unconscionable clause or contract. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 560,
562 (1954). This is changed by the current subsection (1), which provides that a
court "may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result"
17 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1), comment 3.
18 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1).
19 See note 14 supra.
20 "Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414,
73 P.2d 1272 (1937), where a clause limiting time for complaints was held inapplicable
to latent defects in a shipment of catsup which could be discovered only by micro-
scopic analysis; Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144
S.E. 327 (1928), holding that a disclaimer of warranty clause applied only to express
warranties, thus letting in a fair implied warranty; Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co.,
(1934 CA) 1 K.B. 17, holding that where a car with substantial mileage was delivered
instead of a 'new' car, a disclaimer of warranties, including those 'implied,' left
unaffected an 'express obligation' on the description, even though the Sale of Goods
Act called such an implied warranty; New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. G. A. Spears,
194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922), holding that a clause permitting the seller, upon
the buyer's failure to supply shipping instructions, to cancel, ship, or allow delivery
date to be indefinitely postponed 30 days at a time by the inaction, does not indefinitely
postpone the date of measuring damages for the buyer's breach, to the seller's ad-
vantage; and Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100 Kan. 376, 164 P. 273 (1917),
where under a similar clause in a rising market the court permitted the buyer to
measure his damages for non-delivery at the end of only one 30 day postponement;
Green v. Arcos, Ltd. (1931 CA) 47 T.L.R. 336, where a blanket clause prohibiting
rejection of shipments by the buyer was restricted to apply to shipments where dis-
crepancies represented merely mercantile variations; Meyer v. Packard Cleveland
Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922), in which the court held that a
'waiver' of all agreements not specified did not preclude implied warranty of fitness
of a rebuilt dump truck for ordinary use as a dump truck; Austin Co. v. J. H.
Tillman Co., 104 Or. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922), where a clause limiting the buyer's
remedy to return was held to be applicable only if the seller had delivered a machine
needed for a construction job which reasonably met the contract description; Bek-
kevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 . . . (1927), refusing to allow warranty
of fitness for purpose imposed by law to be negated by clause excluding all warranties
'made' by the seller; Robert A. Munroe & Co. v. Meyer (1930) 2 K.B. 312, holding
that the warranty of description overrides a clause reading 'with all faults and defects'
where adulterated meat not up to the contract description was delivered."
21 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). See notes 73-77
infra and accompanying text.
2 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties);
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719 (contractual modification or limitation of remedy).
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these sections, 23 however, the operative facts of the cases cited 24 suggest
the general area of the draftsmen's concern.
Further understanding of the legislative intent can be gleaned from
related sections in the sales article of the Code. Section 2-719, governing
contractual modification or limitation of remedy, renders prima facie un-
conscionable a contract in which there is a limitation of consequential dam-
ages for personal injury in the case of consumer goods.25  Another applica-
tion for section 2-302 is suggested by the comment to section 2-718: if an
unreasonably small amount is stipulated as liquidated damages, such a
provision might be stricken as unconscionable when the loss is far greater
than had been anticipated. 26 Although the Code has specific sections gov-
erning requirements contracts and disclaimer clauses, 27 it would be myopic
to read these sections independently of section 2-302. For in order to
realize the full impact of section 2-302, it is essential to view it in the context
of a Code policy that the rules stated shall be sufficiently broad to be
adaptable to unexpected cases rather than inflexible hornbook principles
which would have to be manipulated to fit the desired results in situations
beyond the possibilities imagined at the time of drafting.
28
During this legislative development, the scope of the section has been
increased in several respects: the provision's applicability has been extended
to other than form contracts; the possible narrowing effect of the early
comment references to equity doctrine has been eliminated; and the judi-
ciary has been given a choice of available remedies. It was the intention
of the draftsmen that the section's future applicability be given direction
by the badges of unfairness common to the illustrative cases cited in the
comment. Confronted with the possible enforcement of a harsh contract
or clause, these decisions had invoked sub silentio a doctrine similar to that
23 See notes 114-15 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory
overlap problem.
24 See the examination of the case law development at notes 29-32, 41-62 infra
and accompanying text.
2 5UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719(3).
26UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718, comment 1. This suggestion of the
comment might conflict with a literal interpretation of § 2-302. Under § 2-718 the
court is directed to judge the reasonableness of the stipulation of damages clause
not only at the time the contract was made but also in the light of actual harm
incurred. This dual directive is authorized under § 2-718 for a court confronted with
a large liquidated damages clause and a small actual loss; a court viewing the converse
situation under § 2-302, being limited to construction of the contract at the time it
was made, can determine the reasonableness only of the anticipated damages in
ruling on the clause's unconscionability. It probably could not declare the clause
unconscionable because the loss actually incurred was far in excess of the stipulated
amount when judged retrospectively.
27UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306 (output, requirements, and exclusive deal-
ings) ; UNIFORM CommaRclAL CODE § 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties).
283 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 2175 (1955). Professor Fulda points out the following as examples of "general
clauses which permit adaptation to new conditions": § 2-103 (1) (b)--"merchants must
observe 'reasonable commercial standards'"; § 2-716(1) -"specific performance may
be decreed where goods are unique or 'in other proper circumstances'"; § 3-511(1)
-" 'reasonable diligence'"; § 8-406(1) (a)--" 'good faith and due diligence'"; § 1-203
-"' obligation of good faith' "; §§ 1-204(1), (3)-" 'reasonable time,' "'seasoiably'"
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enunciated in the section. And since the legislative history affords little
other insight as to the section's reach, the facts of the cited cases assume
critical importance in lending some sense of definitude to the seemingly
amorphous statutory provision.
THE CAsE, LAW
Background
Judicial protection against nonfraudulent but oppressive agreements
has deep roots. Centuries ago, the chancellor granted the mortgagor an
equity of redemption, thereby providing him with a means of meeting his
obligation and yet avoiding the absolute and drastic consequences of failure
to repay on the date due.2 9 The principle behind this development is evi-
denced in many equity decisions.30 For example, the payment of a water
bill, thought to be excessive, under fear that the supply would be cut off,
has been found to be coerced-the excess was recoverable.31  Equity has
similarly afforded relief against surprise; thus, a buyer with special knowl-
edge of a property's future value has been denied specific enforcement of
his quick contract with an uninformed vendor.32 Such problems of eco-
nomic duress and unfair surprise also arise in sales law and have been
accentuated in recent years by the increasing use on the part of large
industrial sellers of the standardized form contract in order to keep pace
2 9 Emanuel College v. Evans, 1 Ch. R. 18, 21 Eng. Rep. 494 (1625). Hanna
describes the plight of the farmer-mortgagor in sixteenth-century England as follows:
"In the case of a mortgage of agricultural land, under any conditions and particularly
under conditions of primitive agriculture, the likelihood of quick repayment is rela-
tively small. Early loans were not long-time loans. A succession of crop failures
will prevent even the able and industrious farmer from earning anything. The loan
by the mortgagee is consequently likely to be at a higher interest rate (itself a
factor, tending to make repayment difficult), and is likely to extend only to a small
portion of the value of the land. Where the exact date of tender of loan is insisted
upon, forfeiture may be occasioned by accident, flood, or similar mischance ....
It is then this type of pressure and apparent hardship which induces the chancellors
to disregard the strict terms of the mortgage conveyance and recognize a tender after
the 'law day' as sufficient to redeem the land from the mortgagee. Thus is created
the 'equity of redemption." HANNA, CASES ON SECURITY 658-59 (3d ed. 1959).
3 0 E.g., Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U.S. 581, 589-91 (1893) (balance due on pur-
chase of cattle paid under duress; held recoverable) ; Butler v. Duncan, 47 Mich. 94,
10 N.W. 123 (1881) (devisee forced by economic circumstances to sell his expectancy
"for a song"); Niggeler v. Maurin, 34 Minn. 118, 24 N.W. 369 (1885) (mortgagor
conveyed equity of redemption under pressure of financial difficulties). Much of this
development is reviewed by Mr. justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326-30 (1942). The principle was also
operative in early English statutes. See Amendment of the Law, 1705, 4 & 5 Anne
c. 3, §§ 12, 13; Actions on Breaches on Bonds Act, 1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, § 8.
Both statutes dealt with penal bonds and provided that the obligee was allowed to
have execution only for the actual damages suffered by him.
3 1 Westlake & Button v. City of St Louis, 77 Mo. 47 (1882).
32 Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (1908). See Forman v.
Gadouas, 247 Mass. 207, 142 N.E. 87 (1924), where, although the court recognized
the same principle, the evidence was insufficient to support the master's findings that
the woman vendor parted "with her home and only means of income under a contract
improvidently, unconscionably and hastily made, when she . . . acted without inde-
pendent advice." Id. at 210, 142 N.E. at 88-89.
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with the mass production of goods and services.38 Such pad contracts
present the ordinary consumer with a Hobson's choice, extended by a
seller with superior bargaining power who has the advantage of unilaterally
setting most of the terms incident to the buyer's remedies for dissatisfaction.
From the civil law this phenomenon is appropriately designated the contract
of adhesion 34--a bMte noire to which the buyer affixes his signature after
bargaining only over the filled-in terms. In a few areas, such as insur-
ance 35 and dealer franchise contracts,8 6 abuse of the standardized contract
practice became so flagrant that legislative action was taken to protect the
adhering party. But in most of the day-to-day sales transactions, the
courts, saddled with a body of well-defined contract law which holds a party
bound by his signature, are caught in the dilemma of either enforcing the
harsh contract or incurring the accusation that they are violating "freedom
of contract." 7
In such a posture, some courts, perceiving no freedom in such con-
tracts, have resorted to various formalistic devices to avoid enforcement.38
83 Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 701 (1939).
34 This term was introduced into the American common law in reference to in-
surance contracts where the insured was said to have merely "adhered" to the pre-
determined terms of the contract. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life lImrance Policy,
33 HARv. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919). However, the development of the concept in
American contract law is primarily the product of scholars with a civil-law back-
ground. See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUm.
L. REv. 1072, 1088-89 (1953); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm. L. REv. 629 (1943).
8 5Insurance companies have been compelled by legislatures to insert particular
clauses into their contracts. VANcE, INsuRANcE 59 (3d ed. Anderson 1951).
88These standardized contracts contained exculpatibn. and termination clauses
which the courts continued to enforce despite their obvious one-sidedness. See, e.g.,
Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir.
1940); Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1933).
See also S. B. McMaster, Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F.2d 469, 473-75 (E.D.S.C.
1925) ; Kessler, Auto Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YAIX
L.J. 1135, 1155 (1957). This state of affairs w% as -remedied by federal legislation
which gave the dealer a cause of action in the federal courts for failure of a manu-
facturer "to act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or
provisions of the franchise, or in terminating . . . the franchise with said dealer."
70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958). Similar legislation is found in many
of the states. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 16827 (1960); Wis. STAT. § 218.01
(1957). See generally Note, 70 HAv. L. Rav. 1239 (1957). A similar abuse in the
use of forms led Congress to intervene regarding common carrier liability to customers.
Interstate Commerce Act § 20, 24 Stat. 386 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20 (1958).
37 The classical theory of contract is that "unlimited freedom of making promises
was a natural right." Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YAL L.J. 454, 456 (1909).
Compare Sir George Jessel's famous statement in Printing & Numerical Register
Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875): "[I]f there is one thing more than
another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts ....
You have the paramount public policy to consider-that you are not likely to inter-
fere with the freedom of contract." But see Kessler, supra note 34, at 642, where
the argument is advanced that "freedom of contract must mean different things for
different types of contracts. Its meaning must change . . .with the degree of
monopoly enjoyed by the author of the standardized contract." For a case illustrating
these conflicting pulls, see Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116
F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1940).
8 See notes 41-62 infra and accompanying text.
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But numerous others adhere to the principle of contractual freedom and,
notwithstanding the harshness, hold that a party who enters a contract for
fair consideration and in compliance with the other common-law require-
ments necessary to the formation of a binding contract is not entitled to
relief.39 Because of these countervailing forces of opinion, the express
holdings of the cases are often irreconciliable. 40 But in certain of the more
common unconscionable situations a pattern of judicial treatment can be
discerned by focusing not so much on the results of the cases as on the
relevant facts emphasized by the courts in reaching their decisions.
Indirect Avoidance of Unconscionability
The ubiquitous disclaimer of warranty 41 in the manufacturers' standard
contract form has given rise to a considerable volume of litigation. The
proffered justifications for the widespread use of a "guarantee" which
guarantees limited liability or a "warranty" which disclaims warranties are
the desirability of industry's selection and control of risks in the marketing
of its products and the necessity for business to shield itself from the
"irrational factor" present in a jury trial.42  Decisions involving these dis-
claimers evidence a dissatisfaction with the unfairness resulting from this
commercial practice. Thus, when faced with a defense based on a printed
disclaimer, the courts have often found failure of consideration 43 or lack of
39 See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 198 (2d Cir.
1955) (summary judgment granted on grounds of time limit clause of form contract
ticket); Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 205
F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (summary judgment granted since disclaimer precluded
action for negligence).
40 Compare Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 347 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1960) (party
bound by manufacturer's standard disclaimer), with McCown v. Jennings, 209 S.W.2d
408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (identical warranty interpreted to allow recovery). On
"waiver of defenses," compare Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d
385 (1958), with Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d
908 (1937).
41 The manufacturer's standard disclaimer is in effect a limitation of remedy to
replacement of defective parts under the set terms; the total exclusion of all warranties
is a rarity. The uniform warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers' Association
runs as follows: "It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or
implied, made by either the dealer or the manufacturer on the motor vehicle, chassis,
or parts furnished hereunder except as follows: The manufacturer warrants each
new motor vehicle (including original equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer
except tires), chassis or parts manufactured by it to be free from defects in material
or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation under this warranty
being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof which shall,
within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or
before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur,
be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination shall
disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty being expressly
in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or
liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to assume
for it any other liability in connection with the sale of its vehicles." Quoted in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 367, 161 A.2d 69, 74 (1960).
42 Kessler, supra note 30, at 631-32.
43 See, e.g., Laitner Plumbing & Heating Co. v. McThomas, 61 S.W.2d 270
(Kansas City Ct. App. 1933) ; Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951).
The doctrine of consideration can be easily manipulated by the judges to achieve
practical results. See Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 783, 794-98
(1941).
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mutual assent 44 to circumvent the effect of the disclaimer. In addition,
the rules of offer and acceptance, 45 the inadequacy of the pleadings,4 6 and
the nebulous norms of public policy 47 have on occasion been used to obtain
the desired results. The courts also have interpreted the disclaimer in such
a manner as to exclude express warranties only; 48 equally common has
been resort to a unique interpretation of the clause which, though contrary
to accepted canons of construction, has the intended consequence of
eviscerating the disclaimer.49
Although these decisions are often clothed in a formal contract doc-
trine, certain salient facts constantly reappear to influence, if not determine,
the courts' holdings. The importance of a formidable document with fine
print disclaimers which the buyer never noticed-and much less under-
stood-is frequently underscored by the courts in denying defenses based
on the fine print.50 The favored party has almost always drafted the form
contract clause on which his defense is based; 51 likewise, the parties are
often of unequal commercial experience. 52  This recurrent factual pattern
44 See, e.g., Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 117, 77 S.E.2d 583,
589 (1953) ; Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 91, 48 S.E.2d
653, 658-59 (1948).
45 Celanese Corp. of America v. John Clark Industries, Inc., 214 F.2d 551 (5th
Cir. 1954) (a battle of forms; held that the acknowledgment order form, containing
the disclaimer, was subsequent to the formation of the contract).
46 Davis Motors, Dodge & Plymouth Co. v. Avert, 294 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956) (disclaimer provision improperly pleaded under local rules).
47 See, e.g., Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 354, 127 F.
Supp. 187 (1955); Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co. v. Noyes Buick Co., 93
N.H. 348, 351, 41 A.2d 920, 922 (1945) (dictum).
48 See, e.g., Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 89, 216 N.W. 790, 791 (1927)
("[implied warranty] arises independently and outside of the contract"); Meyer v.
The Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922); Jarnot
v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
49 Hambrick v. Peoples Mercantile & Implement Co., 228 Ark. 1021, 311 S.W.2d
785 (1958) ; Diamond Alkali Co. v. Godwin, 100 Ga. App. 799, 112 S.E.2d 365 (1959),
aff'd, 215 Ga. 839, 114 S.E.2d 40 (1960) ; Stryker v. Rusch, 8 App. Div. 2d 244, 187
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1959) ; Meehan v. Kaveny Bros. Oil Co., 27 N.J. Super. 547, 99 A.2d
841 (Super. Ct 1953) ; McCown v. Jennings, 209 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
50 Celanese Corp. of America v. John Clark Industries, Inc., 214 F.2d 551 (5th
Cir. 1954) (printed acknowledgment order form); Hambrick v. Peoples Mercantile
& Implement Co., supra note 49 ("printed in small type") ; Myers v. Land, 314 Ky.
514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951) ("long and formidable document"); Joseph v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1953) ("printed book of instructions"
limiting liability); Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48
S.E.2d 653 (1948) ("so located as to easily escape attention"; "stipulation in fine
print").
51 See Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 354, 127 F. Supp.
187 (1955) ; Myers v. Land, supra note 50; Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra
note So. Naturally, the drafter of the form contract is the party who pleads the
disclaimer clause as a defense. Cf. Marion Mach., Foundry & Supply Co. v. Cin-
cinnati Coffin Co., 162 Ohio St 455, 124 N.E.2d 132 (1955), where the purchaser
was bound by the exclusive remedies set forth in a purchase order form which he
had prepared and submitted to the manufacturer.
52 The disclaimer usually arises as a defense when an average customer is suing
a large company. See, e.g., Hambrick v. Peoples Mercantile & Implement Co., 228
Ark. 1021, 311 S.W.2d 785 (1958) (buyer of cotton-picking machine v. farm imple-
ment company); Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1953)
(buyer of pressure cooker v. department store).
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indicates that the courts are more concerned with the ability of the buyer
to comprehend the meaning of the disclaimer and its effect on his rights
than with the construction obviously intended by the manufacturer. The
importance of such factors is not overlooked even by those courts which
hold that the disclaimer precludes the buyer's recovery. Although many
courts enforce "unbargained for" disclaimers which immunize the seller
from liability for his negligence or defective merchandise, they often have
thought it necessary to offer other grounds in support of their decisions
and have been unwilling to rest enforcement of the clause solely on the find-
ing of a signed contract.5 3 These additional reasons emphasize that the
party being "oppressed" authored the form contract or that the expertise
of the parties was equal or favored the one seeking to avoid the harsh
clause.54  Moreover, in cases not affording any doctrinal excuse for non-
enforcement, some courts have displayed a distaste in being constrained to
recognize a defense based on a clause which so offends "the sense of justice
of the court" 55 and have expressed hope that the legislature will relieve
them of such a duty.
56
Similar observations can be made in situations where the purchaser
has signed a conditional sales contract form which is usually supplied to the
seller by a finance company. Such contracts invariably contain a "waiver
of defenses" whereby the buyer surrenders, in any action brought by the
finance company to collect on the contract, all defenses which he could have
raised against the seller. Even if the buyer reads and fully understands the
clause, the unavailability of conditional sales financing on terms other than
those offered forces him to accept. Where the clause has been declared
"contrary to public policy," the courts have not infrequently noted the "long
closely printed agreement form" 57 supplied by the enforcing party and the
likelihood that the waiver clause was overlooked by the customer. On the
other hand, some courts permitting the finance company to recover have
5 3 Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co.,'163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947)
(letter specifically called attention to conditions in contract) ; Norton Buick Co. v.
E. W. Tune Co., 351 P.2d 731 (Okla. 1960) (buyer's request for repairs was always
honored by dealer); Magar v. Lifetime, Inc., 187 Pa. Super. 143, 144 A.2d 747
(1958) (buyer failed to carry burden of proof). But see Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc.,
108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Christie v.
Thomasville Sales Co., 98 Ga. App. 151, 105 S.E.2d 254 (1958); Dimoff v. Ernie
Majer, Inc., 347 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1960).
54 Whane Supply Co. v. Gregory, 291 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1956) (buyer's "long
period of use and his knowledge of machinery of the type in question) ; Richardson
v. Waterite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 99 N.W2d 265 (1959) (both parties were expert in
the field); Marion Mach., Foundry & Supply Co. v. Cincinnati Coffin Co., 162 Ohio
St. 455, 124 N.E.2d 132 (1955).
55 Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 165 N.E2d 107, 109 (Mass. 1960).
56 Moss v. Gardner, 228 Ark. 828, 832, 310 S.W.2d 491, 493 (1958) ("If manu-
facturers continue to resort to such fine print on the back of the contract, it may be
that a person buying an expensive piece of machinery will have to take a lawyer
with him."); Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., supra note 55 (citing UNiFORM Col-
MF.clAL CODE § 2-316, court indicated that a case arising under the Code would not
be controlled by precedent as was the instant case).
57 Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E2d 385 (1958) ("long
closely printed agreement form") ; Industrial Loan Co. v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214
(Mo. App. 1938) (buyer filled in blanks).
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emphasized the maturity and intelligence of the purchaser in support of
their decisionsY8 The relevance of such considerations is difficult to com-
prehend unless the court is not in fact basing its decision solely on the
expressed grounds but is also vitally concerned with what the contract
neant to both parties at the time it was made.
A body of cases involving time limitations which require that "any
dispute or claim . . .must be made in writing within ten working days
after the receipt of the goods" are likewise based on unarticulated premises.
The established rule is that time limits beyond which no action may be
maintained by the buyer are valid for "patent" defects,5 9 but that when such
defects are labelled "latent," the rules of reasonableness determine the
period within which suit may be brought. 60 Using a process not unlike that
employed in the disclaimer and waiver cases, the courts are likely to label
a defect "latent" to circumvent an explicit contractual time limitation clause
buried in the printed form supplied by the seller. Their decisions often
evidence an awareness of the meaning which the buyer would have been
likely to have placed upon the provision had he read it-that is, that its
pervasive terms applied only to reasonably noticeable defects.61
The outcome in many of these cases which void a harsh clause is not
compelled by the contract doctrine on which it is pegged. Certainly, the
language of some of the "ambiguous" disclaimers does not support the
resulting judicial interpretation; and it is not inconceivable that a "waiver
of defenses" clause, unnoticed in a "long closely printed form," would be
declared consistent with public policy., Likewise, a provision clearly re-
quiring that the seller must be notified of all defects in the goods within
a specified time does not by its terms exclude hard-to-discover defects.
Although these decisions sound in traditional contract doctrine, thereby
preserving the "myth that the law of contracts is of one cloth," 62 the
results are merely a hodgepodge of borderline cases unless one looks to
what the courts are in fact doing.
58 See, e.g, Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d
908 (1937) (court noted that purchaser was a grown man and a teacher) ; Hartford-
Connecticut Trust Co. v. Clark-Barone Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 368, 154 A.2d 883
(Super. Ct. 1959) ("buyer and seller stood on equal footing"). But see Jones v.
Universal CIT Credit Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 75 S.E.2d 822 (1953); Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Il. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 (1956) (recovery allowed
solely on ground of a signed conditional sales agreement).
59 E.g., Oliver Farm Equip. Sales Co. v. Neely, 50 Ga. App. 231, 177 S.E. 606
(1934); Truscon Steel Co. v. Fuhrman & Schmidt Brewing Co., 327 Pa. 10, 192
At. 679 (1937).
60W. F. Main Co. v. Fields, 144 N.C. 307, 56 S.E. 943 (1907); Kansas City
Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
6 1 see, e.g., Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93
Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937); National Grocery Co. v. Pratt-Low Preserving Co.,
170 Wash. 575, 17 P.2d 51 (1932) (formal contract sent by seller "contained on its
back, closely typewritten" a time limit clause); Note, The Sales Contract as a
Limitation of the Privilege of Inspection, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 64 (1935). But cf.
Walter Pratt & Co. v. W. C. Morris & Co., 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1035, 87 S.W. 783 (Ct.
App. 1905) (buyer was an "experienced druggist" and knew whether goods could be
examined within the time specified).
6 2 Kessler, supra note 34, at 634.
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In terms of presaging the application of section 2-302, the reasons ex-
pressed in such decisions are obviously less important than the common
factors behind the holding. It is most significant that the vast majority of
these cases involve form contracts in which the crucial provision is
printed in type sufficiently minute to deemphasize its importance and dis-
courage a careful reading.63 This does not mean, of course, that the
presence of a printed form contract per se determines the outcome; it does
indicate that the vast majority of such "agreements" occur in circumstances
inimical to genuine dickering over certain printed clauses. When handed
a printed form to sign, the buyer will ordinarily concern himself only with
the provisions to be filled in-those for which he has actually bargained-
and will overlook or ignore the clauses governing the remedies available
to him in the event the merchandise proves defective. To the ordinary
customer, the filled-in terms constitute the transaction. Even if the
deceptively termed "warranty" or the printed "waiver" were expressly
called to his attention, it could hardly be supposed that he would be made
cognizant of what he is sacrificing. 64 The chances are remote indeed that
a buyer, quickly skimming the fine print, will test the meaning of the clause
(if it means anything at all to him) in the context of potential fact situa-
tions. Will he realize that the "warranty" seeks to preclude recovery for
personal injuries if his new automobile should suddenly veer off the high-
way into a wall? 65 Something more than simply referring a customer to
legalisms in a printed form must be done to inform him of his rights-or
lack of them-under the contract.66
This analysis, centered on the range of understanding between the
contracting parties, is more sharply exemplified in cases dealing with
specification of damages clauses. Generally, courts will not enforce a
specification of damages clause if it is a "penalty." Although not all victims
of an improvident bargain are protected by this rule, the courts display
a willingness to protect those who have "entered into an improvident
agreement to pay an exorbitant sum of money in the event of . . . default
in some respect which does not, in fact, cause anything like equivalent
damage to the other party." 67 If the claiming party has incurred no dam-
63For a collection of the various means of making important clauses illegible
see Mellinkoff, How To Make Contracts Illegible, 5 STAN. L. REV. 418 (1953).
64 For a study of the different meanings which words have to different people,
see Probert, Law and Peruasion: The Language-Behavior of Lawyers, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 35 (1959). See generally KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY (4th ed. 1958);
OGDEN & RIcHARDs, THE MEANING OF MEANING (5th ed. 1938).
65 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
66An example is UNIFORM COMmRCIAL CODE §2-316, which sets up explicit
rules governing enforceable disclaimers: to exclude warranties of merchantability the
language must mention the term "merchantability"; a warranty of fitness may be
excluded by general language, but the exclusion must be written and conspicuous.
If the disclaimer is in the body of the form, "conspicuous" means that it must be
in larger or other contrasting type, or of a different color. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-201(10). Such a test would not be satisfied in most current standard manu-
facturers' warranties.
67 fBurnett v. Nolen, 336 Ill. App. 376, 379, 84 N.E.2d 155, 156 (1949).
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ages, the clause has usually been held to be a "penalty." 68 This so-called
"no harm" rule 69 is merely a judicial expression for denying recovery
in a situation where the parties obviously did not intend the stipulated
relief to be effective. Although it has been suggested that an equitable
result could be reached by manipulation of the "reasonable endeavor to
ascertain actual damages" requirement for a liquidated damage clause,
70
the courts have been more inclined to withhold their imprimatur on the
express grounds that in such a case no actual damage has been incurred.71
By adopting this approach, the tribunal is forced to acknowledge that the
parties understood themselves to be setting a fixed figure which would be
applicable in the event damages occurred. And by holding that, despite
a technical breach, the liquidated damage provision becomes operative only
in the event of actual damage, these cases offer an analogy to the tack which
a court applying section 2-302 should take in deciding the issue of un-
conscionability.
72
The Campbell Soup Case
A leading unconscionable sales contract case in equity, Campbell Soup
Co. v. Wents,73 offers an excellent illustration of the contrasting techniques,
direct and indirect, utilized to police harsh contracts. The case involved a
grower-canner form contract for the sale at a fixed price of all the
Chantenay red-cored carrots to be grown on fifteen acres of the Wentz
farm during the 1947 season. The agreement was the standard type used
by Campbell in dealing with farmers; it contained numerous fine-print
clauses favorable to the company. Among the more significant were these:
the carrots were to have their stalks cut off and be in clean sanitary bags
or other containers approved by Campbell; the company had the right
to refuse carrots in excess of twelve tons to the acre; grower promised
not to sell carrots to any other person (carrots rejected by Campbell were
excepted from this requirement), and he further agreed to permit no one
else to grow carrots on his land; liquidated damages of fifty dollars per acre
were set for any breach by the grower while no damages were stipulated
in the event of a breach by Campbell.7 4  The provision thought to be
"hardest" gave Campbell the right to reject any carrots which it was unable
68 See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) ; Massman
Constr. Co. v. City Council, 147 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1945); Pinta v. Kral, 285 Ill.
App. 232, 1 N.E.2d 876 (1936). But see McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 586, 297
P2d 981, 987 (1956).
69 Comment, Liquidated Danuages and the "No-Harm" Rule, 9 STAN. L. REv.
381 (1957).
70 Id. at 385-86.
71 See note 68 supra.
72 1 N.Y. LAw REVisioN COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
655-56 (1955).
73 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). For a critical analysis of the decision, see Note,
Grower-Canner Agreements: An Abuse of Mass Standardized Contracts, 58 YALE
L.J. 1161 (1949).
74 172 F.2d at 83.
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to handle and use either because of any labor dispute or because of any
circumstance beyond the control of Campbell. Under this clause, if the
demand for its products should decrease and production consequently fall
off, Campbell could refuse delivery of the carrots and force the farmer into
an unfavorable market.75
After the contract was signed, the market price trebled the fixed
contract price and the farmer refused to perform. Campbell sued in equity
for specific performance. The lower court denied relief on the grounds
that Chantenay red-cored carrots, although scarce, were not unique-an
indirect means of avoiding enforcment of the contract. 76 In contrast, the
Third Circuit rejected the district court's application of the "unique" re-
quirement and based affirmance expressly on the unconscionability of the
contract, which it found "drawn by skillful draftsmen with the buyer's
interest in mind" and consequently "one-sided." 
77
The methodology of this case is significant in that it affords the courts
at law a precedent for expressly policing unconscionable contracts; it ilus-
trates the approach anticipated by the framers of section 2-302. But a
careful application of the section would not produce the same result.
78
Although the Third Circuit relieved the farmer of an unprofitable deal, it
also prevented Campbell from obtaining its carrots at the preseason bar-
gained contract price on which it had relied. It reached this result by
declaring the entire contract unconscionable because of the one-sidedness
of several fine print clauses which were not in issue, inasmuch as they
admittedly did not prevent an otherwise binding contract from arising.79
Under section 2-302, a better balance can be struck, for a court has the
alternative of eliminating only the unconscionable clauses and enforcing the
remainder of the contract.8 0 In this way, the bargain to sell carrots at a
set price is given effect without regard to the fact that it has turned out to be
very profitable for only one of the parties.
Section 2-302 faces this problem by directing the court's attention to
the time at which the contract was made.81 Future planning, dependent
upon the stability of long range contracts, is not upset by the section's
provisions. When the contract suddenly becomes advantageous to one of
the parties, it is still an enforceable bargain as long as neither "unfair
75 Id. at 83 & fll. It is likely that any inability on the part of Campbell to use
the carrots would have been caused by weakened demand-"a circumstance beyond
the control of Campbell." Thus, the farmer had no protection in the event of a decline
in the market, although Campbell was covered if the market price rose.
76 75 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
77 172 F.2d at 83.
78 Note, however, that a different result is not mandatory. If a court should find
that the practice of making harsh contracts can be eliminated only by striking the
entire contract, this maximum remedy remains available under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-302(2), comment.
79 Campbell was bound to accept the carrots which did in fact conform to the
specifications set forth in the contract, provided, of course, that production was not
curtailed.
80 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
81 Uwniop. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1).
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surprise" nor "economic duress" was evident at the time of its creation.
The contract may conceivably fall hard upon one party but section 2-302
was not intended to void every unprofitable venture of the market place.
If the section were extended to encompass all such agreements, no one could
rely on what he naturally hopes to be a profitable bargain when he enters
into it.
A possible conflict with the underlying rationale of the section-to
avoid relief from harsh contracts-is posed by the profitable bargain which
reaches gross proportions. It is conceivable that external factors may
so affect the contract that the extent of the benefit to one party was never
remotely contemplated at the time the contract was made. It is also possible
that economic circumstances coerced a party into the only agreement
possible at that moment-a moment when his immediate financial needs
had to be satisfied and the other party was the only person available who
could do so. In such cases, a court might be inclined to modify the contract
to approximate more nearly that which the parties could have reasonably
anticipated or demanded, on the grounds that to allow a grossly excessive
profit or an unreasonably lengthy contract period would be unconscionable.
This approach would still uphold the profitable bargain within reasonable
limits. 82
CIVIL LAW DEVELOPMENT
The problems posed by the standardized mass contract are not peculiar
to the common law. In fact, it was civil-law scholars who first singled
out contracts of adhesion (contrats d'adhesion) as an area of contract law
badly in need of adjustment.83 At the turn of the century, Saleilles, the
originator of the term, asserted that standardized form contracts partake
more of the nature of statutes promulgated by businessmen and their
counsel than of mutually bargained agreements.8 4 Because of the early
and continued attention given such contracts, the civil law experience is
valuable in anticipatilfg the future scope of section 2-302.85
Both the German and the French systems treat the "unbargained for"
contract with broad flexible provisions similar to the unconscionability
concept of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 138 of the German Civil
Code takes both a general 86 and a specific 8 7 approach to harsh contracts
82 Cf. note 67 supra and accompanying text.
8 3 SALEILLES, DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLANTP 229-30 (1901); see PRAUSNTz,
THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL
LAw (1937) ; Kessler, supra note 34. See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 34.
842 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE No. 972a (1959) ; PRAuSNiTz, op. cit. supra
note 83, at 122.8 5 This value was recognized in the 1 N.Y. LAw RmSI ON COMMISSION, STUDY
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 97-99 (1955). For a discussion of the advantages
of a comparative law study in construing the entire code, see Schlesinger, The Uni-
form Commercial Code in the Light of Comparative Law, 1 INTR-Am. L. REv. 11
(1959).
8 6 BfRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 138, para. 1 (Ger. 19th ed. Palandt 1960): "Eim
Rechtsgeschiifl, das gegen die guten Sitten verstdsst, ist nichtig:" [A legal trans-
actiorn that is against good morals is void.]87 BORGERLICHES GESETzBucH § 138, para. 2 (Ger. 19th ed. Palandt 1960):
"Nichtig ist insbesondere emn Rechtsgeschiift, durch das. jemand unter Ausbeutung
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which are against good morals (gegen die guten Sitten), while article 242
imposes upon the contracting parties a specific duty to act according to the
requirements of good faith, with due regard to ordinary usage s8 thus giving
the aggrieved party a defense. In addition, article 826 allows a suit for
damages if the contractual language was intentionally contrary to gute
Sitten.89 The French doctrine of abus des droits, like its German counter-
part, has been used both as a shield and a swordY0 Where the doctrine is
invoked as a defense, it is generally believed that its basis is derived from
the modern theory of Josserand that "every Code article or other statute
creating a right must be interpreted as limiting the exercise of such right
to the objects for which it was created." 91 That principle's broad compass
is illustrated by articles 1131 92 and 1133 '3 of the French Civil Code,
which make void all obligations contrary to good morals (bonnes moeurs)
and public order (ordre public). In addition to these general code rules
governing contracts, the civil-law scholars have taken a similar approach
to contrats d'adhesion in their treatises.
4
Although these principles might seem to give the civil-law courts
dangerously extensive discretion, experience has shown that they have been
applied with caution and have not upset the stability of commercial trans-
der Notlage, des Leichtsinns oder der Unerfahrenheit eines anderen sich oder einem
Dritten fiir eine Leistung Vermigensvorteile versprechen oder gewiihren lasst, welche
den Wert der Leistung dergestalt iibersteigen, dass den Umstdnden nach die Ver-
inigensvorteile in auffalligem Missverliltnisse zu der Leistung stehen." [In particular,
a legal transaction is void whereby a person, exploiting the difficulties, indiscretion or
inexperience of another, causes to be promised or granted to himself or to a third
party for a consideration pecuniary advantages that exceed the value of the considera-
tion to such an extent that, having regard to the circumstances, the disproportion is
obvious.]
88 BfTRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 242 (Ger. 19th ed. Palandt 1960) : "Der Schuldner
ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zi bewirken, wie Tren und Glauben mit Riicksicht
auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern." [The debtor or promisor is bound to effect the
performance according to the requirements of good faith, with due regard to ordinary
usage.]
8 9 BRGaERLIcHEs GESETZBUCH § 826 (Ger. 19th ed. Palandt 1960) : "Wer in einer
gegen die guten Sitten verstossenden Weise einem anderen vorsiitzlich Schaden
zufiigt, is dern anderen sum Ersatze des Schadens verpflichtet." [A person who
intentionally causes damage to another in a manner contrary to good morals is bound
to compensate the other for the damage.]
90 SCHLESINGER, COmpARAT=W LAw 376 (2d ed. 1959). When used as a cause
of action, it is supported by article 1382 of the French Civil Code, which provides
that "every act of a person which causes damage to another obliges the person through
whose fault the damage occurred to repair it." Translated in SCHLESINGER, op. cit.
supra at 49 n.10.
9 1 SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 90, at 376.
92 CODE CIVIL art. 1131 (Fr. 58th ed. Dalloz 1959) : "L'obligation sans cause, ou
sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause illicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet." [An obli-
gation without cause, or one based on a false or illicit cause, has no effect.]
93 CODE CIVIL art. 1133 (Fr. 58th ed. Dalloz 1959) : "La cause est illicite, quand
elle est prohibie par la loi, quand elle est contraire aux bonnes inoeurs ou a l'ordre
public." [A cause is illicit when it is prohibited by law or when it is contrary to good
morals or the public order.]
94 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 84, at No. 972a; SALEILLES, op. cit. supra note 83,
at 229-30.
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actions. 95 Under the German practice, the courts will not apply the doctrine
of gute Sitten unless the party seeking its application proves that his op-
ponent has been exploiting his difficulties, indiscretion, or inexperience
(der Notlage, des Leichtsinns oder der Unerfahrenheit).96 In passing
upon these prerequisites, the German courts weigh the disparity of experi-
ence between the parties to determine whether an intelligent choice was
possible under the circumstances, and, if so, what the parties understood
the nature of their choice to be.97 In both the French and the German
systems, the mere fact of a disproportionate bargain is not recognized as
sufficient grounds for setting aside the contract.98 In balancing the experi-
ence of the parties, an inquiry comparable to that suggested under section
2-302 must be made-the courts focus on the relative positions of the
particular parties at the time the contract was made to determine how the
contract was formed.99
Several opinions of the German Reichsgericht show striking similarity
to those of our own courts regarding the factors considered relevant in
determining the enforceability of allegedly unfair contracts. The one-
sidedness of the form contract and the insignificance of the printed provi-
sion which exempts the maker from liability are particularly important. 0 0
But, in addition, the continental courts have noted the effect of the utiliza-
tion of a particular standard form on an industry-wide basis: 101 in this
instance, the element of free choice by the purchaser is precluded regard-
less of his awareness of the terms of the contract or their meaning. Such a
factor is seldom alluded to by American courts,102 although it would cer-
tainly appear to be a relevant factor in examining a contract for unconscion-
ability under the Uniform Commercial Code.
From this brief description, it is evident that the civil-law courts have
applied code provisions similar to section 2-302 where the parties had no
free choice or where the choice turned out to be a surprise to one of them.
The criteria employed by the German and French courts are not unlike
those present in our own cases circumventing the effect of harsh contracts
or clauses. In light of these well-settled standards, a German court de-
95 See PRAUSNITZ, op. cit. sipra note 83, at 106-19; Dawson, Economic Duress
and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law (pts. 1-2), 11 TuL. L. Rv. 345,
12 TUL. L. REv. 42 (1937) ; Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAmB. LJ. 22, 40 (1933).
See also PRAusiTrz, op. cit. supra note 83, at 90-105.
96 See note 87 supra.
9
7 For a development of the statutory terms, see Dawson, supra note 95, at 62-64.
Dawson translates the terms as "necessity, inexperience or thoughtlessness."
9 8 VON MEHREN, THE CivIL LAW SYsTEM 529 (1957).
99 See the opinions collected in SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 90, at 355-65.
100 See Opinion of the German Reichsgericht in the Matter of Suedd. Transp.
Vers. A.G., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W., Defendant-Respondent, RGZ 106,386 (1st Civ.
Div. 1923) (translated in SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 90, at 358).
lol Ibid.; Opinion of the German Reichsgericht in the Matter of G., Defendant-
Appellant v. St, Plaintiff-Respondent, RGZ 103,82 (Ist Civ. Div. 1921) (translated
in SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 90, at 355).
102 For an exception, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
390-91, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960).
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claring a contract contrary to gute Sitten or a French court holding an
agreement to be against bonnes moeurs or ordre public is invoking a rule
of law quite distinct from what is conveniently termed public policy by our
own courts. 10 3 The operation of these civil-law principles is similar to that
anticipated for the unconscionability provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code: they have a distinct and defined area of application and are not
merely decision-disguising catchalls which courts may invoke when a
contract is too harsh to enforce and the law leaves no other loophole. This
solution to the unconscionable contract has given the civil-law courts
desirable flexibility, while at the same time encouraging them to meet the
issue squarely.' 0 4 The civilian judge's handling of harsh contracts in terms
of general principles may strain the traditional compartmentalized approach
often associated with his common-law counterpart. But perhaps such a
strain is in order in this corner of our contract law.10 5
THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2-302
The disadvantages of the techniques presently relied upon by our
courts to negative oppressive contracts stand out in bold relief against the
civil-law experience. By distorting the construction of contract language,
the courts have merely encouraged the draftsmen to become more skilled
in phrasing a substitute.1 6 If one adaptation fails when subsequently tested
by litigation, an infinite number of revisions still remain untried. That such
a process breeds unnecessary litigation is obvious. Judicial use of these
circuitous devices creates difficulty in yet another way: needless confusion
in case-law development is engendered. Although a court might be hard
pressed to distinguish one of its earlier unconscionability holdings expressed
in terms of a particular contract doctrine, it is not likely to view it as con-
trolling authority on the same contract issue where no defense of harshness
is available. And the converse situation poses similar diffculties. In such
potentially misleading circumstances, an attorney may fail to litigate a valid
103 See PRAUSNITZ, op. cit. upra note 83, at 96.
104 There is one significant exception to the direct approach: the German and
French tribunals construe standardized contractual terms strictly, in a fashion com-
parable to the construction of statutes. See PRAusNITz, op. cit. supra note 83, at
120-35.
105 "The experience of continental countries . . . suggests one conclusion that
is of paramount importance for Anglo-American law-that is, the impulse for growth
in case law which comes from imaginative generalization." Dawson, .supra note 95,
at 72.
106 Compare Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 88, 216 N.W. 790 (1927), where
the disclaimer read: "No warranties have been made in reference to said motor
vehicle by the seller to the buyer unless expressly written hereon . . . " with Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 367, 161 A.2d 69, 74 (1960). The
disclaimer used in Henningsen is the one currently used by the trade. It should be
noted that this revised version did not deter the Henningsen court from invalidating
it. For an example of the advantages of the more direct approach, see Campbell
Soup Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952), where the court had no trouble
upholding a grower-canner contract which was a completely revised, more equitable
version of the agreement found unconscionable in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172
F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). See notes 73-82 supra and accompanying text.
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claim or defense, or he may press an argument when it has little chance
of success.
Illustrations of two typical sales transactions may serve to highlight the
contrast between the disadvantages inherent in the present treatment of
harsh agreements and the improvements which section 2-302 would in-
troduce into the law. Suppose Customer decides to purchase a substantial
amount of lumber from Company for the purpose of repairing the roof on
his house. After looking over several grains of wood and haggling over
the price and the terms of payment, Customer agrees to take a specific type
of lumber at the bargained price. On one of its printed agreement of sale
forms, Company then fills in the price and the description blanks as agreed
upon. Customer checks the price figures and signs the form without
noticing the printed list of conditions on the reverse side, one of which
stipulates that "all claims for defects in merchandise must be made within
ten working days after the receipt of the goods." Four weeks after Cus-
tomer installs the lumber, it proves defective and causes the roof to buckle.
In a state which has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, the
issue would probably be framed as whether the defect was "latent" or
"patent." 107 In such a case, a court which is reluctant to enforce the time
limitation could easily label the defect "latent," provided the fault in the
wood was not obvious to the naked eye. In this way, the ten-day limita-
tion would be transformed into a rule of reasonableness and the four-week
delay would probably not bar Customer's cause of action.108 [Such a deci-
sion might induce the Company to change its form contract and substitute
a disclaimer of all express and implied warranties. But even this device
holds little security for the Company: in future litigation, a court deeming
the disclaimer unfair could ignore it by finding that the buyer was probably
unaware of its existence at the time he contracted and thus that its inclusion
in the agreement lacked mutual assent.10 9 In the course of this judicial
juggling, "all claims for defects" is construed to mean "some," and a dis-
claimer of all warranties is sidetracked entirely. Or instead of changing
its printed contract, Company might choose to retain the time limit provi-
sion and litigate any close case in the hope that another court might find
another defect "patent." This is a high price to pay to enable a court to
protect a party from a bargain he never made.
Section 2-302 is designed to do away with this indirect method of
decision. The court is directed to look to the scope of the actual agree-
ment entered into by the parties at the time of the sale. The presence of
the form contract and the relative experience of the parties are considered
in ascertaining the terms within the scope of the bargain. In order to
measure the buyer's freedom of choice, the court might also inquire as to
the extent to which such standard forms are uniformly used by all lumber
107 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
108 See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
109 See the invitation for the courts to find "lack of mutual assent ' in note 44
.stpra and accompanying text.
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dealers. The issue is what meaning was attached by the parties to the time
limit condition. Did Customer read it as excluding after ten days all claims
for defects regardless of their nature? Or did he believe it applicable to
readily discoverable flaws only? Or did he ignore the fine print completely
and merely make certain that the price per square foot was as agreed? If
the court finds the understanding to be that the clause covered something
less than all defects, it could apply section 2-302 and "limit" the time clause
so as to allow Customer a reasonable notification period. A harsh provi-
sion-harsh because not bargained for-is thus deleted from the contract.
Company now knows the real rationale of the court's decision and is not
misled by a play on the contractual words; rather than attempt new
schemes or continue to litigate old questions, Company will be alert to the
necessity of bringing all enforceable terms to the buyer's attention in dear
and unmistakable language before expecting a court to recognize and
enforce such a provision under the Uniform Commercial Code.
In addition to being applicable to situations which involve "unfair
surprise," section 2-302 is equally available to cope with the one-sided and
oppressive contract."10 Suppose Automobile Buyer agrees to purchase a
new sedan from Dealer. The agreement of sale contains the standard
warranty suggested by the manufacturer which limits Dealer's liability
solely to the replacement of parts which prove defective within ninety days
or 4,000 miles."' This "warranty" is called to Buyer's attention at the
time of the sale. But since more than eighty per cent of all car manufac-
turers use the identical provision, Buyer has no choice but to take the car
with the limiting warranty. Four months after the sale the motor begins
to knock and has to be overhauled at substantial expense to Buyer.
In an action for breach of warranty in a state without the Code, a court
would probably have no recourse 112 except to recognize Dealer's defense
based on the disclaimer, for the contract's language leaves little room for
interpretation.113 Nor would an argument based on lack of mutual assent
be available. But under section 2-302 relief from this oppressive contract
is more easily obtained. Even assuming that the disclaiming warranty
meets the standards imposed by section 2-316,114 Buyer would still have an
argument based on unconscionability. If he can prove that free choice was
precluded because of uniformity among leading car manufacturers in the
2l0 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
"II For the actual language of the disclaimer, see note 41 mipra. Recently, the
auto manufacturers have extended the warranty to twelve months or 12,000 miles.
Bus. Week, Nov. 26, 1960, pp. 55-56. But this warranty still limits buyer's remedy
solely to replacement of defective parts.
112But see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960), where the court voided the disclaimer on public policy grounds. See note 115
infra.
113 The use in the current warranty of the "all express or implied warranties"
language has made the courts' role more difficult. See Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc.,
165 N.E.2d 107 (Mass. 1960); cf. Wilson v. Eargle, 98 Ga. App. 241, 105 S.E.2d
474 (1958).
114 See note 66 supra and accompanying text
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type of warranty offered, the otherwise valid disclaimer should be stricken
under section 2-302.115
CONCLUSION
Although the legal profession is not unaware of the difficulties in the
methods currently used by the courts in disposing of harsh contracts and
clauses, concern over any restriction of "freedom of contract" often checks
any concerted effort to empower the courts to "police explicitly" contracts
of this type. Such alarm is unfounded. Section 2-302 evidences a realiza-
tion that a contract is not a signature affixed to a long printed form but
rather a mutual understanding reached through a process of bargaining.
The provision merely gives the courts authority to strike or modify a
contract where free choice is absent, or where a term of a contract to which
the parties never agreed is invoked, or where a literal reading would
extend the contract beyond all intention of the parties. Such action does not
violate a realistic interpretation of "freedom of contract." The decisions
emphasizing the presence of a form contract with fine print clauses, the
relative experience of the parties, and in some cases the industry-wide
uniformity of terms establish the criteria for refusing to enforce the contract
that never was. Utilizing these guides, the courts will be able to enforce
head-to-head contracts and void unconscionable agreements without con-
stantly being thwarted by inflexible rules and inconsistent holdings. Far
from limiting contractual liberty or disrupting commercial affairs, section
2-302 will contribute to the stability and freedom of contract.1 16
J.H.A.
11 5 For a recent case which emphasized this uniformity among automobile manu-
facturers in support of its refusal on grounds of public policy to give effect to the
standard warranty, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960). The facts of the Henningsen case suggest another possible interplay
involving several sections of the Code. Automobile buyer's wife sued the manu-
facturer and his dealer for damages for personal injuries sustained when the car
crashed into a wall because of a mechanical failure in the steering gear. There was
insufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of negligence and the case was
given to the jury on a breach of warranty theory. The defense was based on the
standard manufacturers' warranty. Assuming that the disclaimer could pass the test
Of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, § 2-719(3) would seem to indicate that that
part of the clause limiting "consequential damages for injury to the person" could
still be found unconscionable under § 2-302.
116 This idea was eloquently expressed by Professor Kessler in Contracts of
Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. Rv. 629, 640
(1943) : "'The prestabilized harmony' of a social system based on freedom of enter-
prise and perfect competition sees to it that the 'private autonomy' of contracting
parties will be kept within bounds and -will work out to the benefit of the whole."
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